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In 2017 it was reported that Ahmed Fahour, CEO of Australia Post – a publicly owned 
company – earned AUD$10.8 million in a single year. In 2015, he was paid 119 times the 
annual salary of the average Australia Post employee ($47,000 per annum). Fahour 
presided over the organisation's greatest decline in company turnover, accompanied by 
large-scale retrenchments of low-paid workers (Evershed, 2017). Yet as extravagant as 
Fahour’s pay appears, it is far from the largest executive remuneration packages paid to 
CEOs in Australia. In recent years, some have surpassed $30 million per annum. In the 
United States (US), CEO pay can be 300 times that of the average wage within the 
company (Mishel and Davis, 2015). Even after a slight ‘correction’ in CEO pay, which 
dipped in Australia during the Global Financial Crisis from an average of $5.5 million 
per annum to $4.7 million, David Richardson of The Australia Institute has recently found 
that CEO pay is on the rise again, averaging $5.2 million last financial year (Patty, 2018; 
Richardson, 2018). 
 
Pay disparities between senior management and workers in the English-speaking global 
metropole – primarily Australia, UK, and the US – have intensified over the last three 
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decades. At the beginning of the 1980s in the US, pay ratios ran at about 20:1. 
Management theorists such as Peter Drucker first suggested in 1977 that any increase in 
a 20:1 ratio would result in ‘resentment and falling morale’ within companies, eroding 
the collective effort and trust upon which business depends (Wartzman, 2011). In the UK 
and Australia at that time, average pay ratios stood at a modest 15:1. Today, that figure 
in Australia and the UK is 183:1 (Walker, 2016), while in the US some executives earn 
373 times the salary of an average rank-and-file worker (High Pay Centre [HPC], 2014; 
AFLCIO, 2015). Meanwhile, corporate regulation implemented since the 1980s appears 
to have encouraged, rather than stemmed, pay disparity and lavish executive 
remuneration.  
 
Pay disclosure regulation is designed to reduce pay disparity. The most common form 
of pay disclosure – pay ratios – involves a comparison between the salary package of 
the highest paid company employee (usually the CEO) with the median salary package 
within the company, calculated by averaging the pay of all workers in the company, 
including low-paid foreign workers and executive employees (e.g. 15:1). These 
measurements of income disparity have recently gained popularity across the global 
north in the wake of the 2007 global financial crisis (GFC). In the US, former President 
Barack Obama invoked the language of pay ratios to illustrate pay disparity, saying that 
‘the typical CEO who used to earn about 30 times more than his or her worker now 
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earns 110 times more’ (Quigg, 2011). The Obama Administration introduced mandatory 
disclosure of pay ratios into US corporate law in 2010. Similar regulatory mechanisms 
involving disclosure of executive pay were implemented in Australia in 2009, but they 
did not require the formulation of pay ratios. In reducing CEO pay, pay disclosure 
models rely on the mechanism of public ‘shame’ to convince shareholders to exercise 
voting rights within companies to block excessive executive remuneration packages. In 
other words, the system relies on the will of shareholders. In Australia and the US, 
current pay disclosure models have resulted in a modest reduction in CEO pay, 
fractionally narrowing pay disparity from the top down by redistributing wealth to 
shareholders (discussed in more detail below). These schemes have not, however, 
increased the real wages of workers. Accordingly, it is claimed here that pay disclosure 
regulation has not had any significant impact on reducing income disparity.  
 
This argument relies on a number of key terms and distinctions clarified here before 
further discussion. The distinction between income and wealth, for instance, conceives of 
the former as a flow and the latter as a stock (of assets) (Stilwell and Jordan, 2007: 46). 
The distinction between CEO ‘salary’ and ‘remuneration’ is also important, given that 
bonus payments, equity plans, stock options and even private school fees and chauffeurs 
mean that CEOs receive other forms of payment, significantly exceeding their base salary, 
that are often standard terms of remuneration packages (HPC, 2015). This broader 
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understanding of pay or remuneration is adopted here. Further, this article is mostly 
concerned with the pay of CEOs rather than a wider stratum of senior managers, 
predominantly due to the limited availability of international data relating to senior 
managers.  
 
This article discusses pay disclosure as a mechanism to regulate pay disparities and 
explores why this form of regulation has had a limited impact. In doing so, it is 
acknowledged that pay disclosure does provide some benefit in enhancing 
accountability, raising social awareness, and supplying policy makers and analysts (such 
as the author) with data. The article also analyses situations where pay disclosure has 
worked well to control pay disparity, identifying key factors involved in such an 
outcome. In doing so, the article locates the discussion of pay disclosure in a field of 
contestation between shareholder value and stakeholder approaches to corporate 
governance and regulation. The first of these approaches focuses on corporate 
governance, while the latter sees its corporate concerns more aligned with regulation. 
Contributors from the ranks of the former have explained pay disparity in terms of its 
relationship to corporate shareholder value (Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 2002; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983; Levinthal, 1988).  Those from the latter – largely critical 
political economists – have identified and represented pay disparity as a significant 
mechanism in generating social inequality and the adverse impacts it creates for wide-
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ranging social stakeholders – workers, consumers and environmental groups (Atkinson, 
2015; Piketty, 2014, Mitchell et al, 2005; Blanpain et al, 2011; Stilwell and Jordan, 
2007; Shields, 2005).  
 
Current evidence suggests that when pay disclosure is implemented for the benefit of 
shareholders – that is, in accordance with the dominant shareholder value model of 
corporate governance – it can reduce CEO pay. Some Australian shareholders appear to 
have recognised what a number of academic commentators have understood for many 
years: that CEO ‘pay for performance’ has only a limited value in enhancing the value 
of shares (Tyson and Bournois, 2005; Shields, 2005; Kenny, 2017). Further, as this 
article points out, this form of pay disclosure does not generate any benefit to social 
stakeholders such as workers, consumer and environmental groups, or the state. Under 
the shareholder value model, pay disclosure merely reduces the gap between the highest 
and average paid workers  by lowering the pay of CEOs and executives and 
redistributing the savings to shareholders, not workers. Some, however, have supported 
pay disclosure regulation in what appears to be a false hope that it will have some 
material effect on wealth redistribution to stakeholders such as higher wages for 
workers or lower prices for consumers (see, for example, the High Pay Centre, the 
AFLCIO Mohan et al (2015), discussed below). It is hard to see how stakeholders such 
as workers and consumers could materially benefit from CEO pay restraint. By contrast, 
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stakeholder approaches to reducing pay disparity can include pay disclosure, but applied 
in combination with taxation or enhanced industrial rights, to redistribute executive pay 
to social stakeholders, including workers. Such an approach addresses pay disparity as 
well as the broader problem of social inequality.  
 
There is a political context for these concerns. Inequality has risen as a major political 
issue in the US, the UK and Australia in the wake of the GFC. This is exemplified by 
the strength of the Bernie Sanders’ bid for the Democratic nomination in the 2016 US 
Presidential election and the unexpectedly strong showing of Jeremy Corbyn as Labour 
Party leader in the 2017 UK general election, both of whom campaigned against 
inequality. In Australia, concern over growing inequality was ignited by the raft of 
inequitable measures proposed in the Abbott government’s 2014 (‘Hockey’) budget, 
and the Australian Labor Party went close to toppling the government in the 2016 
federal election in a campaign that featured previously ‘unthinkable’ policies to reduce 
the capital gains tax and limit negative gearing for property owners. The ALP 
subsequently announced a more explicit ‘Agenda for Tackling Inequality’, including 
reducing tax advantages for discretionary trusts and restoring the penalty rates 
recently reduced for low paid workers. The proposals suggested here could be 
considered as complementing that document.  
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This article is structured in two parts. The first part critically reviews the literature on 
shareholder value to set the scene for a discussion of the relationship between pay 
disclosure regulation and pay disparity in Australia, the US and UK. It also presents 
three case studies demonstrating the consequences of Australian pay disclosure 
regulation for both shareholders and stakeholders in Australian companies. The second 
part analyses social stakeholder approaches to pay disparity, before undertaking a 
review of policy interventions that rely on pay disclosure regulation to narrow pay 
disparity. Discussion of corporate and regulatory practice in both sections is framed 
using a political economy approach.  
 
Shareholder Value and Pay Disclosure Regulation in Australia 
 
Scholars of corporate governance tend to represent pay disparity as a function of 
‘shareholder value’. This embodies the neoliberal principle that the primary duty of 
corporate management is to enhance the value of the company for the benefit of 
shareholders (Friedman, 1970). Those who subscribe to it adhere to the ‘managerial 
power’ model of corporate governance (Bebchuck and Fried, 2004; Gumbel, 2006: 222) 
whereby the interests of shareholders are best served by maximising executive 
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remuneration through ‘CEO-pay-for–performance’ (Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 
2002; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Levinthal, 1988). It is noted that the lack of evidence 
linking high CEO pay to increased productivity has led French economist, Thomas 
Piketty, to see performance pay as part of an ‘apparatus of justification’ within orthodox 
economics (2014: 330-355). There is, nevertheless, some emerging evidence suggesting 
that pay disclosure regulation under shareholder value models has reduced CEO pay and, 
by extension, pay disparity in Australia (Bugeja et al, 2016). As the following will 
explain, however, these reductions in pay disparity have been modest and have had no 
impact on the redistribution of wealth beyond a narrow legal and social class of 
shareholders.  
 
The shareholder value model became part of the law  in Australia under the Howard 
Liberal Government’s Corporations Act (CA) 2001. Under this Act, the power to select 
CEOs and set executive remuneration rests with company managers or boards of directors 
(Sheehan, 2009: 280; CA, ss. 198A, 201J, 202A, 204F). However, a range of regulatory 
interventions has strengthened the power of shareholders within companies while 
challenging executive power. The CA was implemented amidst a range of public policies 
geared toward the marketisation of social life, the privatisation of publicly owned 
companies and the encouragement of ‘mum and dad shareholders’. The Act sought to 
‘democratise’ the shareholder value model through a range of executive pay disclosure 
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mechanisms, primarily for the benefit of shareholders. Yet these measures proved 
somewhat limited, prompting the Rudd-Gillard Governments to pass amendments to the 
Act in 2009 – in particular, to tighten pay disclosure requirements to shareholders 
(discussed further below).   
 
This era of pay disclosure regulation intensified in the mid-2000s following a range of 
corporate scandals involving large payments to departing CEOs. Amendments to the Act 
required listed companies to disclose the complete remuneration packages (including base 
salary, short-and long-term incentives and other payments and allowances) of all directors 
and the five most highly paid executives (CA, s. 300A; PC). This information is now 
required to be set out in a ‘Remuneration Report’ that forms part of a company’s 
compulsory annual reporting obligations (CA, s. 300A). Remuneration disclosed by these 
reports is subject to a non-binding, advisory shareholder vote (CA, s. 250R). Further 
reform to executive pay regulation was precipitated by the GFC in 2007 and the election 
of a Labor Government that ordered a review into executive remuneration. The review 
rejected proposals to include workers in the determination of executive pay and to impose 
salary caps on executive remuneration, claiming that such measures would be difficult to 
implement in practice and could disadvantage some businesses in relation to others (Fels, 
2010). The review did, however, introduce some changes to corporate regulation.  
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Arguably the most effective in relation to reducing pay disparity was the ‘two-strikes’ 
rule, permitting shareholders to vote to reject excessive executive remuneration packages. 
The rule ensures that a 25 per cent vote by shareholders against executive pay packages 
(detailed in the remuneration report at company Annual General Meetings (AGM)) will 
force a board of directors to reconsider an executive pay package (CA, s. 250U): this is 
the first strike. Once the board has reconsidered the pay package, a second ‘strike’ 
(another 25 per cent vote) against a second proposed pay package by the board will result 
in dissolution of the entire board of directors with all seats vacated for re-election within 
90 days (CA, ss. 250V, 250W). 
 
A number of two-strikes-rule votes were delivered by shareholders against Australia’s 
largest remuneration packages just months after the implementation of the rule in 2011 
(Hill, 2015: 67). Since the rule’s inception, around 14 per cent of Australian listed 
companies have reported shareholder intervention in the determination of executive pay 
packages at AGMs using the two strikes rule (Featherstone, 2017). In 2016, shareholders 
within 15 of Australia’s largest companies took advantage of the protest vote laws 
(Durkin, 2016). A study conducted by the Centre for International Finance and Regulation 
demonstrated that, after a first strike, CEO pay fell by 20 per cent in the following year, 
while, after a second strike, it fell by as much as 32 per cent (Bugeja et al, 2016). In so 
doing, these laws reduced pay disparity by redistributing company profits to shareholders 
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(ASX, 2017). Notably, however, this internal corporate wealth redistribution has 
remained precisely that. There has been no discernible 'trickle-down' increase in income 
or wealth beyond the corporate sphere (discussed below by reference to widening gaps in 
social inequality). The following three short case studies demonstrate this pattern. 
 
 
 
Case Study 1 
In 2011, a first strike was delivered against the remuneration packages at Crown Resorts. 
The board reacted by cutting CEO pay from $7.7 million p.a. to $6.9 million per annum 
in the following year (Remuneration Report, 2012: 72; Kitney, 2012). After the vote, 
earnings per share (as distinct from share-price) more than doubled between 2011 and 
2014, to over 90 cents per share and large dividends were issued to the company’s largest 
shareholders (Annual Report, 2014: 13), including a payment of $387 million to James 
Packer, who will be paid an estimated $1.1 billion over the next three years (Ward, 2017). 
Packer is also a non-executive director of the company. But these shareholder gains have 
had only a marginal impact on stakeholders. Since 2011, the casino employee union, 
United Voice, has managed to negotiate a small 3.75 per cent pay rise for workers (United 
Voice, 2017); but in 2017, the casino company decided to sack its poker machine 
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technicians, replacing them with contractors who are paid half of what they currently earn 
- $76,000 per annum (Hannan, 2017). 
 
Case Study 2 
Wesfarmers was struck by two separate shareholder votes against executive pay in 2009 
and 2011 respectively (Mayne, 2011). Accordingly, the board agreed to reduce CEO pay 
by $4 million p.a. (Kenny, 2017). The responsiveness of the board to these shareholder 
strikes has coincided with a 20 per cent increase in the annual price paid per share over 
the last five years (Annual Report, 2017). Stakeholders did not share the windfall and in 
2015, Coles, a major subsidiary of Wesfarmers, underpaid 77,000 part-time and casual 
workers below award wages by $70 million (Schneiders et al, 2016), disadvantaging 
some low-paid workers by as much as $3,500 per annum each (Toscano and Schneiders, 
2016). Coles continues to resist efforts by the relevant union – the Shop Distributive & 
Allied Employees Association (SDA) – to increase pay for its lowest-paid workers.  
 
Case Study 3 
Bluescope Steel suffered a vote against executive pay in 2011 when the company lost $1 
billion and the share price fell from $11 to 70c. The following year, executives responded 
by agreeing to a salary freeze and a 67 per cent cut in bonuses (Tan, 2012). Since then, 
the share price has steadily increased from earnings per share of 57.50 cents in 2011 
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(Annual Financial Report, 2010/2011: 2) more than doubling to $1.25 in June 2017, 
(Directors’ Report 2017: 14), while share prices reached $13.70 in July 2017. These 
shareholder gains followed the pattern identified above, with profits bypassing 
stakeholders other than shareholders. Workers continued to fare badly: 1000 jobs were 
axed in 2011, and in 2015 steelworkers agreed to the loss of a further 500 jobs and wage 
freezes to prevent the closure of the Port Kembla Steelworks (Loussikian, 2015).  
 
These case studies provide evidence of the efficacy of pay disclosure regulation in 
narrowing pay disparity between stakeholders and executives, as well as the relationship 
between CEO pay and shareholders. They show that when company boards are responsive 
to pay disclosure regulation and act to reduce excessive executive pay, shareholders tend 
to see greater returns. Conversely, these observations also suggest that such returns are 
not passed onto stakeholders other than shareholders and sometimes come at their 
expense. While these trends in shareholder gains and other stakeholder losses are unlikely 
to be exclusively linked to two-strikes votes, findings from a wider study on the 
relationship between CEO pay and shareholders supports the link presented here (Bugeja, 
et al, 2016). It is noted that this study did not consider the interests of stakeholders.  
 
Shareholder Value and Pay Disclosure Regulation in the US and Britain 
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Shareholder value models have dominated corporate governance and regulation in the 
United States and Britain since the aftermath of the Great Depression, when shareholders 
were first given the capacity to vote on certain decisions proposed by company boards of 
directors at company meetings. Since the emergence of ‘pay-for-performance’ ideology, 
predominantly in the US in the 1980s, however, shareholders have failed to act to alleviate 
large scale and rapid growth in executive remuneration (Zylberstajn, 2011). This 
sustained trend has seen pay disclosure strategies to regulate CEO pay, such as pay ratios, 
gain popularity. As discussed, the US has recently implemented pay ratio disclosure, 
while British measures to introduce mandatory reporting of pay ratios are gaining 
momentum. Within these respective national regulatory contexts, pay disclosure 
strategies are designed to enhance shareholder power and ‘value’.   
 
Following the GFC, the US Government imposed a new regulatory framework on 
corporate America through the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act 2010 (or ‘Dodd-Frank Act’ (Pub.L. 111-203, H.R. 4173)). Many of the regulations 
imposed by the Act would have been unthinkable in the pre-crisis era. Accomplished 
through the bipartisan draftsmanship of Republican Senator Barney Frank and Democrat 
Senator Chris Dodd, the Act aims to achieve ‘financial stability’ through greater corporate 
regulation. As well as benefiting the market, the Act was designed with workers and 
consumers in mind, with the peak US union body circulating a petition to have CEO-to-
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worker pay ratios written into law (AFL-CIO, 2012). Together with a range of other 
disclosure mechanisms requiring CEOs to justify their pay by reference to firm 
performance (like the Australian reforms discussed above), the Dodd-Frank Act requires 
companies to disclose CEO-to-worker pay ratios as well as the frequently substantial 
inequalities between them. To this extent, the Act has been acclaimed by both labour 
unions and then President Obama as a win for the labour movement and social equality 
more generally (Quigg, 2011; Milligan, 2015). Accordingly, the new law might disclose 
wider social inequalities associated with the gender pay-gap which, at the time the law 
was passed in the US, saw women in full-time employment earning 77 cents for every 
dollar earned by men (De Navas-Walt, Proctor and Smith, 2011: 5, 12). The Act takes the 
progressive step of requiring that the pay of casual and part-time employees, as well as 
companies’ ‘offshore’ workers, is calculated when determining the average pay of 
employees on one side of the pay ratio (USSEC, 2015).  
 
Nevertheless, US pay ratio laws remain entrenched within the shareholder value model 
of corporate governance. American finance commentator, Michael Hiltzik, suggests that 
these laws merely enhance disclosure of CEO pay and encourage greater self-regulation. 
In doing so, they ‘further chisel the myth of shareholder value in the rules of corporate 
behaviour’. Without a public enforcement mechanism, the US experience of pay ratios 
suggests that disclosure alone is not enough to both decrease and redistribute CEO pay to 
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stakeholders. Hiltzik points to elements of the Act’s shareholder value framework and the 
performance-for-pay rule as leading to an increase in ‘predatory pricing, skimping on 
product quality, mistreatment of suppliers, and the manipulation of local communities to 
extract tax breaks and subsidies for factory locations’, all of which ‘reflect the drive to 
upstream all corporate returns to the shareholders’ (Hiltzik, 2015).  
 
The US study of Mohan et al (2015), perhaps misleadingly entitled, ‘Paying Up for Fair 
Pay’, has documented the effect of pay ratios on consumer behaviour. It shows that 
disclosure of pay ratios in relation to US products does in fact change patterns of 
consumption by empowering consumers with knowledge to make ‘ethical’ consumer 
decisions (Mohan, et al, 2015). In this way, the study concludes that pay ratios might be 
seen as a competitive market mechanism to drive down CEO pay from the supermarket 
aisle up. Even so, there is no evidence that such ‘ethical consumerism’ leads to any 
discernible material advantage or benefit being passed onto consumers or workers. It is 
conceded that evidence linking falling CEO pay to median pay increases or consumer 
savings is difficult to gauge. Nevertheless, the case studies of pay disclosure regulation 
and the intensification of worker-stakeholder exploitation, discussed above in respect to 
Australia, provide a compelling insight into the division between pay disclosure 
regulation and material improvements for stakeholders. 
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Other critiques point to the fact that these laws fail to adequately define executive 
remuneration, omitting certain types of equity-based performance pay that accrues over 
time. Executive pay-watch expert Rosanna Landis Weaver suggests that these forms of 
payment mean that ‘if an executive has just received a massive options grant, he might 
look underpaid this year, but overpaid in 10 years when he cashes it in’ (Weaver, quoted 
in Anderson, 2016). 
 
The British High Pay Centre (HPC, 2015) claims to have addressed some of these failings 
of the US pay ratio system in proposals for a pay ratio regime in Britain. The calculation 
of pay ratios under the British model, for instance, is more comprehensive than under the 
existing US model and involves two salient points. First, the employee side of the ratio 
must reflect the average pay of all workers within the company (including overseas 
workers and those reclassified as ‘independent contractors’). Such a method is used by 
British retail firm John Lewis, which deploys the term, ‘non-management partners’ to 
describe workers and others whose pay is accounted for on one side of the ratio (HPC, 
2015:24). Second, CEO pay on the other side of the ratio must include their total 
remuneration, not merely single figure or realised pay, as in the case of the US Dodd-
Frank Act (HPC, 2015). As mentioned above, such a figure accounts for future bonuses 
and a lengthy list of non-taxable benefits, ranging from the provision of free chauffeurs 
to private school fees.  
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Like corporate regulation in the US, the Companies Act 2006 (UK) adopts a strong 
‘shareholder value’ approach, affording shareholders a range of decision-making power 
about the governance of the company and the removal of directors. Interestingly, 
however, in its most recent report, the HPC states that the objective of amending the 
Companies Act to include pay ratios is not necessarily to enhance shareholder value or 
rights within the company (HPC, 2015: 49). According to the HPC, the objectives of pay 
ratios are to provide an accountable framework for the calculation of executive pay by: 
(i) holding executives to account to shareholders and stakeholders alike for ‘rent-seeking’ 
behaviour and differential treatment; (ii) altering existing market-based formulations in 
which companies simply compare the pay package of their CEO to those of CEOs in 
similar positions (resulting in a zero-sum game which, over time, has ratcheted-up CEO 
pay and increased managerial power); (iii) calculating CEO pay, not on the basis of 
market equivalencies, but for value to the organisation; (iv) comparing the work of CEOs 
with other stakeholders within the company; (v) measuring pay in terms of creativity, 
competence, responsibility and their ability to add value to the company. These discursive 
or ‘behind the scenes’ aspects of pay ratios, say the HPC, mean that pay ratios value the 
work of all company employees, not simply senior managers, improving fairness in the 
way that CEO pay is calculated.  
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These measures may result in a small reduction to CEO pay and a redistribution of 
company resources to shareholders, as in the case of Australian pay disclosure regulation. 
But, like the Australian and US regulatory context, these proposed British laws do not 
appear to actually effect a redistribution of company resources to stakeholders (and in 
fact contradict pay disclosure models recommended by a 2014 HPC report, discussed 
below). The HPC’s latest claims in respect to redistribution of company resources are 
speculative, to say the least, suggesting that ‘money distributed to executives … could of 
course (be) retained for investment, for example in technological advances…(or) 
training’, leading to enhanced ‘productivity’. The HPC nevertheless concedes that, ‘in 
most cases … this is not so’ (HPC, 2015: 38). That is, the HPC now concedes that pay 
disclosure will probably not redistribute executive pay to stakeholders. Such a concession 
appears to acknowledge the limited capacity of pay disclosure regulation to narrow pay 
disparity.  
 
Another problem with the UK pay ratio proposal is that it lacks a clear mechanism of 
enforcement, even to merely enhance shareholder value. British researchers have argued 
that pay ratios operate through powerful social motivators such as shame, embarrassment 
and humiliation, arising from relationships between CEOs, shareholders and stakeholders 
(HPC, 2015) and that, rather than relying on a vote of shareholders, executives will be 
shamed into rescinding some of their earnings. As evidence of the embarrassment that 
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surrounds high pay, the HPC points to the reluctance of the business lobby to share 
remuneration details of their wealthiest executives (HPC, 2015: 46-47). However, as 
some trade unionists have argued, even if executives are required by law to disclose their 
earnings in the form of a pay ratio, ‘how do you shame people who are shameless?’ (cited 
in Moore, 2017). Indeed, the brief experience of mandatory pay ratio disclosure in the US 
shows that pay ratios alone have led to little change in executive remuneration practice. 
In Australia, where pay disclosure within the largest companies has been required by law 
for at least five years, CEOs have not been stirred by shame to sacrifice their pay. Rather, 
where pay disclosure has worked to reduce CEO pay, it has done so in coordination with 
other regulation (discussed below) or strong binding votes by shareholders to reduce CEO 
pay and redistribute the proceeds among themselves.   
 
Accordingly, the British proposals do not overcome the problems inherent within the US 
and Australian models, derived from a shareholder value regulatory framework. In this 
sense, pay disclosure regulation does not take a ‘stick’ to pay disparity: rather it appears 
to wave a magic wand. It merely suggests redistribution to stakeholders rather than 
actually requiring it. 
 
The social stakeholder approach to pay disparity: concentration of wealth, 
globalisation and wage stagnation 
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Shareholder value approaches to pay disparity have been challenged primarily by social 
stakeholder theorists from within the fields of corporate law, industrial relations and 
business management. Beginning with Lord William Wedderburn in the early 1980s, 
their solutions to pay disparity have been less concerned with corporate governance than 
with the redistribution of power and material resources from the owners and managers of 
capital (CEOs and shareholders) to other ‘stakeholders’ such as workers and their unions 
as well as and consumer and environmental groups (see, for instance, Mitchell et al. 2005 
and Blanpain et al. 2011). This group have been joined in their opposition to shareholder 
value models by political economists, who have contested the political legitimacy of 
corporate governance and understood pay disparity as an issue of social inequality and 
inequity. Their heterodox approaches, such as those taken by Thomas Piketty (2014), 
Anthony Atkinson (2015) and, in an Australian context,  Stilwell and Jordan (2007), have 
explained pay inequality as being entrenched within the prevailing form of neoliberal 
globalisation and the dynamics of capital. At the heart of this reinvigorated stakeholder 
perspective is an emphasis on the dispersion of wealth, rather than income, and the role 
it plays in enduring and intractable social relations of inequality, including corporate pay 
disparity. Piketty, for example, suggests that the extent of pay disparities between 
executive management and most paid workers may be understood as a telling indicator 
of a global historical dynamic in which 1 per cent of the world’s population own 50 per 
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cent of the world’s wealth. Using the same methodology, Oxfam has recently shown that 
the world’s eight richest men own the same amount as half of the world’s population 
(2017).  
 
A significant reason for this inequality is the material difference between income and 
wealth. Whereas income is a flow of wealth over time, usually exchanged for work or 
services and consumed by daily expenditure, wealth is the capacity to derive income from 
the ownership of assets without the need to work for other people. (Pen, 1973; Stilwell, 
1993; 2007; Piketty, 2014; Atkinson, 2015). Where the overwhelming majority of 
stakeholders earn income, the overwhelming majority of shareholders are wealthy. This 
has been confirmed by several significant studies since 2002,showing that the wealthiest 
10 per cent of Australian households own 61 per cent of liquid assets, such as shares 
(Headey et al, 2005: 165; HILDA, 2002, Sheil and Stilwell, 2016). The bottom line is 
that, where enhanced executive pay disclosure has benefited shareholders, it has not 
redistributed wealth, but rather reorganised ownership of wealth among the wealthy. 
Additionally, high executive income has intensified ownership of liquid wealth by the 
wealthiest one per cent (Piketty, 2014: 355, 658). 
 
It is in the context of these larger historical global trends of social inequality that high 
managerial incomes have made an impact. As mentioned previously, high incomes have 
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increased extremely rapidly and in a short time, permitting CEOs of large companies to 
amass a significant share of the functional distribution of income, compared to other 
workers, with seemingly little justification. Writing in this journal, John Shields, showed 
within the 16 year period 1989-2005 Australian executive pay increased by 564%. In the 
same period, the wages of full-time adult male employees increased by 85%. To describe 
this relationship, Shields deployed a pay ratio between CEO and average earnings, 
showing that the ratio increased from 18:1 to 63:1 (Shields, 2005: 302). As discussed at 
the outset of this article, ratios of over 100:1 are now commonplace in Australia’s largest 
companies. Today, where minimum salaries for members of the 1 per cent start at around 
$227,534 per year, salaries of the 0.1 per cent begin at around $600,625 per year (Martin, 
2015).  
 
These trends in pay inequality, identified by Shields over a decade ago, have continued 
into the present. While profits soar, real wages stagnate and wage growth is at an all-time 
low. In the December quarter of 2016, profits surged by 20.1 per cent while wages fell by 
0.5 per cent (Janda, 2017). Australian rates of jobless poverty are the second worst in the 
OECD (OECD, 2015). So too are rates of underemployment which continue to grow as 
the creation of new part-time and casual employment outstrips the creation of  full-time 
jobs by two-to-one (ABS, 2017). At the bottom of the waged hierarchy, workers earn a 
minimum wage of $34,980.40 per annum, before tax, for a 38-hour week across most 
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Australian industries (FWO, 2017). In 2017, the Fair Work Commission  announced a cut 
in ‘penalty rates’ – the minimum pay for overtime and irregular working hours, usually 
associated with the work of the lowest paid workers in the hospitality and miscellaneous 
employment sectors.  
 
The  work of UK economist, Anthony Atkinson, echoes Shields’ findings and also brings 
to the debate a practical list of regulatory proposals to minimise inequality, primarily 
through heterodox and Keynesian economic policies (2015: 151-153; 302-304). In 
emphasising the importance of workers as stakeholders in the running of private firms, 
Atkinson (2015) and the HPC (in 2014) proposed a range of measures involving pay 
disclosure within large companies. Unlike examples of pay disclosure allied to 
shareholder value, discussed above, their proposals are linked to policies designed to 
redistribute corporate wealth to stakeholders (2015, 153). Taken together, these measures 
include policies such as: (i) pay limits or maximum pay ratios, meaning that executives 
cannot earn more than a certain multiple of their lowest-paid employee; (ii) representation 
for workers on company boards and remuneration committees; (iii) increasing the top-
rate of income tax; (iv) company-wide profit sharing; (v) and a new Companies Act with 
legally-binding provisions to ensure equal pay for equal work. Each of these measures is 
examined in turn below. Such proposals are supported by the work of other stakeholder 
theorists, such as Mitchell and his colleagues (2005: 419), who have suggested that both 
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corporate and industrial interests are interconnected and that companies must be regulated 
in a manner that reflects this complementarity through a regulatory coupling of corporate 
and labour law. The work of these stakeholder theorists indicates that pay disclosure is 
more likely to be effective in lowering pay disparity between workers and CEOs when 
linked to other regulatory strategies that change the social relations of production.   
 
Pay limits or maximum pay ratios 
 
The practice of using pay ratios to structure limits on executive pay and set wages relative 
to the earnings of executives existed long before the use of pay ratios as a mere disclosure 
mechanism that benefits shareholders. In fact, the use of pay ratios to enforce fair pay has 
a significant history over the course of the twentieth century, evolving in Europe at the 
same time as shareholder value regulation was commencing in the US and UK. Its origins 
can be traced to the Basque region of Spain in the 1950s. It was here that a federation of 
worker co-operatives, together with the Catholic Church, established the Mondragon 
Corporation, a collectivist (sometimes called ‘anarcho-syndicalist’) manufacturing 
corporation in which a form of pay disclosure – pay ratios – has been relied upon to 
constrain pay disparity in the workplace by redistributing profits to workers. Such use of 
pay ratios, central to the corporate structure of Mondragon, is often cited as the reason for 
the company’s continuing success (although one commentator has noted a recent decline 
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in certain overstretched multinational arms of the company (Errasti et al, 2017)). Ratios 
within the company are decided periodically, not by shareholders, but by workers through 
a democratic vote. In these circumstances, ratios between the highest and lowest paid 
workers range from around 3:1 to 9:1, but frequently average around 5:1 (Herrera, 2004). 
On this basis, employees at Mondragon earn comparatively more than workers with 
similar skills at other companies in Spain and globally (Flecha 2011: 161). The system of 
industrial democracy at Mondragon also means that, when the market takes a downturn, 
workers vote to decrease wages in the interests of maintaining full employment within 
the company (Tremlett, 2013). The Mondragon model has been transplanted to other 
centres of industry around the world, including the US where it has been embraced by the 
United Steelworkers in 2009 resulting in the Ohio Employee Ownership Center (OEOC), 
a co-operatively run union steel workshop in which pay ratios are central to the 
organisation of the business.  
 
Similar proposals have recently been debated in Switzerland where a constitutional 
referendum on regulating pay disparity resulted in a landslide victory. Proposals to ban 
compensation and large payouts, or ‘golden parachutes’, for departing CEOs gained an 
overwhelming 68 per cent support of the vote (BBC, 2013). A separate referendum 
proposal to introduce mandatory 1:12 pay ratios within Swiss companies nevertheless 
foundered, but only by a slim margin (Garofalo, 2013). Meanwhile, British Labour Party 
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leader, Jeremy Corbyn, has recently called on the use of pay ratios to impose a maximum 
wage law or cap (Elgot, 2017), suggesting that ‘pay ratios between top and bottom’ would 
mean ‘that the rewards don’t just accrue to those at the top’ (Corbyn, 2016). These 
proposals, along with the ratios established at Mondragon, are suggestive of the tolerable 
limits of pay ‘disparity’ while clarifying what relative ‘parity’ might look like. 
 
Enforceable pay limits under the Mondragon model pay ratio model mean that a 
significant amount of company profit, that might otherwise be paid to executives in 
excessive remuneration, is reinvested into the company to enhance firm productivity. 
Similarly, Stilwell and others have suggested that excess CEO salaries might be 
reinvested in technology and education both within and outside the corporation (Stilwell, 
2002; see also, Goldin and Katz, 2008: 29, 141, 320-323). 
 
Representation for workers on company boards and remuneration committees 
 
Perhaps the most favourable option to reduce pay disparity involves enhancing 
democratic processes within corporations by extending participation in corporate 
governance to stakeholders in the industrial sphere (Mitchell et al, 2005; Ross and 
Markey, 2002). Allowing workers to set pay by voting, for instance, on a reasonable pay 
ratio is an effective way for companies to decrease pay inequality between their 
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workforces. Such a model necessarily requires complete transparency in executive pay 
but connects pay disclosure to possibilities for meaningful redistribution of company 
wealth to stakeholders. As previously shown, the success of this stakeholder model has 
been demonstrated at the Mondragon Corporation and its North American subsidiaries. 
A similar approach to pay ratios is the German model of industrial democracy.  
 
In Germany, since the late nineteenth century, rank and file workers have been appointed 
to company work councils to assist in the co-determination of company decision-making, 
including decisions about remuneration. The largest German companies are required to 
have a dual board of directors – one supervisory and one management board. By law, at 
least half of the representatives on supervisory boards within large companies (those with 
over 2000 employees) are required to be workers within the company (Addison, 2010). 
German workers also sit on corporate remuneration committees, helping to determine 
executive pay by reference to a range of stakeholder interests (TUC, 2012: 4). The 
German system of co-determination and similar models in Scandanavian countries have 
meant that CEOs are paid at least 20 per cent less than their US, British and Australian 
counterparts (Eurostat, 2007). Further, CEOs in German companies with board-level 
employee representation are paid half as much as other CEOs (Hans Bockler Foundation, 
2017). Draft legislation that is designed to provide dual boards with power to use pay 
ratios to set pay for both workers and executives within the company is currently before 
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the Bunderstag. These proposed laws provide stakeholders (in this case, workers on 
supervisory boards) with power to index all pay within the company to CEO pay, by 
reference to a pay ratio (Shotter and Chazan, 2017).  
 
It must be pointed out, however, that German workers are paid around 11% less than 
Australian workers (OECD 2017). Nevertheless, German unemployment and 
underemployment rates are roughly half of what they are in Australia (Eurostat, 2017; 
ABS, 2017). Effectively, this means that rates of pay disparity and social inequality are 
lower on a comparative societal basis. Conversely, German and Scandanavian firms have 
seen higher rates of labour productivity than in Australia, yielding higher returns for 
investors and shareholders (OECD, 2017). Heterodox economists such as Wolfgang 
Streek and Joel Rogers (1995) have found that such outcomes are directly attributable to 
worker participation in internal company strategy to increase productivity. In the face of 
declining rates of unionisation and participation in the Australian workforce, work 
councils may prove an increasingly necessary strategy for Australian workers and trade 
unions to pursue in reducing pay disparity by enhancing industrial democracy.  
  
 
Taxation 
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There is a range of taxation interventions that renders pay disclosure more effective in 
narrowing pay disparity by redistributing company wealth to social stakeholders. One 
such strategy involves identifying companies with high pay ratios for higher taxation 
treatment. After disclosure of CEO pay through the Dodd-Frank Act, Portland in Oregon 
(US) has become the first city in the world to tax companies in which CEOs earn more 
than 100 times their median-paid employee. The tax is 10 per cent of the amount of 
conventional State business tax. Under this model, a company with a 250:1 ratio would 
pay a 25 per cent tax. The tax is expected to raise $2.5 million per annum with funds to 
be redistributed to homeless services within the city (Floum, 2016). This model could 
certainly be extended to other pay ratio jurisdictions and used more widely to reduce pay 
disparity by redistributing wealth.  
 
Such an intervention is similar to recommendations by economists such as Emmanuel 
Saez (2002; 2012) to use pay disclosure mechanisms to identify a new tax bracket of 
super-high income earners. As Saez suggests, this would permit the state to recoup and 
redistribute excess CEO and executive earnings, narrowing pay disparity by progressively 
reducing the taxation burden on lower income earners. The Australia Institute has also 
suggested placing a cap on taxable deductions from CEO remuneration above a certain 
level and requiring a minimum tax rate of 35% for those earning over $300,000 per year 
(commonly known as ‘the Buffett Rule’, after its creator, US billionaire, Warren Buffett) 
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(Grudnoff, 2015). While the plan is supported by the ALP left faction in Australian 
federal politics, it is opposed by the dominant right faction (Jericho, 2017) and is 
markedly absent from the current ‘Agenda for Tackling Inequality’ (2017).   
 
Mandatory company-wide profit sharing 
Pay disclosure regulation could be enhanced by being coupled with policies of 
mandatory, company-wide profit-sharing. Such a policy has existed in France since the 
late 1960s. The current, Social Security Financing Law 2011-894 (July 28, 2011), 
applies to companies with more than 50 employees. Where such a company increases 
dividend payments to shareholders, above the average dividend payment from over the 
previous two years, the company must compulsorily share profits with workers. The law 
ensures that when shareholders feel the benefits of company profits, such as those 
associated with a redistribution of executive pay, workers should prosper too. Under the 
law, payments to workers must not merely be symbolic. Formulas for the calculation of 
such payments, however, differ (Law 360 France’s New Legal Framework for Profit 
Sharing Premiums). The minimum formula for the compulsory profit sharing scheme is 
calculated as 0.5 x (net profit – 5 per cent of share capital) x total wage bill/value. In 
2009, the maximum amount of profit required to be shared to each employee was 
25,731 Euros. The amount paid to workers is open to negotiation with unions and 
workers through a European Work Council model of co-determined industrial relations. 
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It has been some time since shared profits were measured as a percentage of total 
income but, on last analysis in the 1990s, shared profits comprised between 4-6% of 
French wages (Vaughn-Whitehead, 1991: 62; ILO, 1992: 79).  
 
Such a model is, in part, reliant on a shift in the social relations of production that 
affords stakeholders a meaningful voice within the workplace. Nevertheless, where this 
scheme is mostly enshrined in law, there is reason to think that such a scheme could be 
adopted within an adversarial system of industrial relations that operates in a 
shareholder value corporate regulatory context. Unlike maximum pay ratios and pay 
limits, which mostly operate in co-operative firms such as the Mondragon Corporation 
and John Lewis, a key benefit of mandatory, company-wide profit sharing is that it 
redistributes profit from shareholders to stakeholders more generally. It might therefore 
operate effectively to reduce pay disparity in firms currently operating under the 
dominant shareholder value model. 
 
Amending the Corporations Act with legally-binding provisions to ensure equal 
pay for equal work 
Yet another suggestion to narrow pay disparity involves establishing a legally-binding 
Code for setting pay within companies, extending beyond existing industrial award 
systems, minimum wages and remuneration committees. As Atkinson suggests (2015: 
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153), such a Code might determine the pay of both high and low paid employees by 
reference to a formula involving equal pay for equal work. Further, this formula would 
not only reduce general pay disparity but also narrow the gender pay gap while 
increasing the pay of migrant workers (Atkinson, 2015: 153). In 2014, the HPC 
suggested a similar legally binding Code requiring company directors to have regard to 
a diversity of stakeholders - including workers, consumers, partners and the wider 
society - whenever a corporate decision is made, especially those concerning pay (2014: 
17).  
 
Such a policy might be thought of as a form of wage regulation, a policy which played a 
key role in the post-war boom as well as staving-off the effects of recession at the end of 
the ‘Golden Age’ in the early 1970s. It was at this time that the regulation of wages and 
prices to combat inflation was a key feature of the British Labour Government of Harold 
Wilson in 1965, the US Nixon administration in 1971 and the Australian Hawke Labor 
Government in the mid-1980s. Wage freezes were not uncommon. However, the focus 
was less on regulating high wages and their growth than with lower paid workers and 
maintaining productivity. They were also part of a centralised system of wage regulation, 
rather than a decentralised model, moderated by an external regulator, such as a legally-
binding pay Code. 
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Conclusion 
Over the past two decades, Australian corporate regulation has, to some extent, been 
responsive to economic crisis and public perceptions of pay disparity. However, these 
responses have relied on shareholders and companies to deliver social change through 
self-regulation. This self-regulation has been informed by a range of pay disclosure 
mechanisms. The dominant models of such pay disclosure regulation have claimed to 
reduce excessive executive pay but this regulation has had no significant impact on 
increasing the wages of workers, nor benefiting other stakeholders. It appears that the 
beneficiaries of the pay disclosure regulation, such as that implemented in Australia and 
the US, have not been all stakeholders but only shareholders. Accordingly, any reduction 
in executive income has added to  the stocks of wealth owned by shareholders.  
 
Serious concern to narrow pay disparity must consider other options to enhance the 
efficacy of pay disclosure regulation by ensuring a wider redistribution of wealth and pay 
between stakeholders and shareholders. ALP policymakers currently developing policies 
to tackle inequality in the labour market therefore face a choice. This is between 
regulation, on the one hand, that relies on pay disclosure alone to encourage shareholders 
to reduce pay disparity by enriching themselves or, on the other hand, a system of pay 
disclosure that reduces pay disparity by redistributing income from the highest to average 
paid workers and other stakeholders. Taking the latter approach to reducing pay disparity, 
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pay disclosure regulation needs to be linked to more extensive corporate and industrial 
policy. Strategies allied to pay disclosure, such as enforceable pay ratios, worker 
representation on company boards, new taxation measures, profit-sharing and binding 
pay codes are essential to changing power relations within the workplace and society 
more generally and producing a redistribution of pay and wealth.  
Eugene Schofield-Georgeson is a lecturer at the University of Technology Sydney (UTS) 
Law School. eugene.schofield-georgeson@uts.edu.au 
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